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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On April 7, 1969, Dr. Wernher von Braun, director of NASA’s Apollo 
Applications Program, established the Lunar Roving Task Team at Marshall Space Flight 
Center in Huntsville, Alabama.1  Acknowledging that “there are no superhighways on the 
moon (yet),” von Braun believed that a specialized “moonmobile”2 would facilitate 
exploration of the moon on Apollo missions 15, 16, and 17.3  The unique physical 
attributes of the moon required that the project engineers from NASA, Boeing, and GM 
construct mechanical systems for the lunar roving vehicle that were markedly different 
from those found on earth-bound vehicles.4  One such integral system pertaining to 
mobility focused predominantly on the four wheels that would carry the rover across the 
moon’s surface.5   
¶2 The wheels had to be specially designed with several considerations in mind—the 
absence of an atmosphere on the moon; extreme surface temperatures fluctuating 
between positive or negative 250 degrees Fahrenheit; a force of gravity measuring one-
sixth of Earth’s gravitational pull; and the relatively unknown conditions presented by 
lunar soil and topography.6  To accommodate the moon’s rough terrain, several 
modifications to the conventional vehicle wheel were proposed.7  The final design 
delivered to NASA featured hollow wheels made of spun aluminum with titanium bump 
stops.8  The vehicle's tires were thirty-two inches in diameter and nine inches wide, and 
they were made of a woven mesh of zinc-coated piano wire to which titanium threads 
were riveted in a “chevron” pattern, giving the wheel traction in deep levels of moon 
dust.9   
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Florida Levin College of Law.  Special thanks to Professor Ralph 
Losey and Professor William Hamilton for their guidance throughout the writing process; Hon. Ron 
Hedges, C. Andrew Roy, and the Editorial Board of the Northwestern Journal of Technology and 
Intellectual Property for their comments; my family for their support in all of my endeavors; and Sarah for 
all of this and everything else.  The author can be reached at jared.beckerman@gmail.com. 
1 NASA, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LUNAR ROVING VEHICLE 4 (Mike Wright, Bob Jacques & Saverio 
Morea eds., 2002) [hereinafter BRIEF HISTORY].  
2 See Getting Along on the Moon, SCI. NEWS, March 18, 1967, at 269, 269–71. 
3 BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
4 Id. at 6. 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 Id. at 6. 
7 Getting Along on the Moon, supra note 2, at 271. 
8 Everly Driscoll, Moon Mobile Debut on Apollo 15, SCI. NEWS, June 12, 1971, at 404, 405. 
9 BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 1, at 7; Driscoll, supra note 8, at 405. 
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¶3 On July 26, 1971, NASA sent the first lunar roving vehicle to the moon with the 
launch of Apollo 15.10  While on its maiden voyage, many of the vehicle’s systems 
suffered fallbacks.11  The wheels, however, functioned quite well, traversing obstacles 
without significant accumulation of dust due to their particular design.12  After the 
proverbial moon dust settled, it became clear that the engineers’ special attention to the 
specific demands of travel on the moon and the resulting consideration given to the 
vehicle’s wheels paid off. 
¶4 Few people, if any, would argue that the issues presented by travel on the earth and 
travel on the moon are the same.  Certainly there are several similarities shared by both, 
as illustrated by the general design of the lunar roving vehicle—four wheels powered by 
a motor13—elements by no means foreign to the modern earth traveler.  However, the 
stark differences between surface conditions on the earth and moon caused designers of 
the rover to quite literally reinvent the wheel,14 without which the lunar roving vehicle 
may not have been at all successful. 
¶5 As intrinsically dissimilar as are the earth and moon, arguably, so are the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules) and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(Criminal Rules).  While both have provisions for jurisdiction, venue, discovery, etc., 
there are undeniable and stark differences between the principles underlying the function 
of each set of procedural guidelines. 
¶6 United States v. O'Keefe15 was the first case in which a court explicitly applied 
provisions of the Civil Rules pertaining to electronic discovery (e-discovery) to a 
criminal action.16  In doing so, United States Magistrate Judge Facciola opined that it was 
not only proper but preferable to turn to the Civil Rules for guidance on e-discovery 
matters in criminal actions.17  Because the rules are the product of countless years of 
revision by judges and scholars, Judge Facciola explained that “it is far better to use these 
rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production of documents in criminal and civil 
cases raises the same problems.”18 
¶7 The court reached the right decision in O’Keefe and appealing to the Civil Rules for 
guidance was well within Judge Facciola’s authority.19  This article will argue, however, 
that the wholesale adoption of the Civil Rules in solving problems of e-discovery in 
criminal actions is not the best solution.  Judge Facciola was correct in stating that “the 
production of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same problems,”20 as the 
 
10 BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18. 
11 For example, on the lunar roving vehicles’ initial run, the front steering mechanism failed to operate, a 
difficulty overcome by driving the rover using only rear-wheel steering.  Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 7. 
14 A main subcontractor to the lunar roving vehicle project, who seized the opportunity in titling a press 
release, used this pun.  See Press Release, General Motors, Delco Electronics Division, GM Reinvented the 
Wheel for Lunar Roving Vehicle (June 1971).  
15 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). 
16 See Justin P. Murphy & Stephen M. Byers, E-Discovery in the Criminal Context: Considerations for 
Company Counsel, DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE (BNA) (Oct. 1, 2009); RALPH C. LOSEY, 
INTRODUCTION TO E-DISCOVERY: NEW CASES, IDEAS, AND TECHNIQUES 15–38 (2009). 
17 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
18 Id. (emphasis added). 
19 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1); see also infra Part II.C. 
20 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
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technical issues (and headaches) in the production of electronically stored information 
(ESI), and they are the same regardless of the type of case in which they arise.  However, 
despite similar problems, the principles underlying the Civil Rules and the Criminal 
Rules may in several instances dictate different solutions to these perhaps shared 
problems.   
¶8 Because there is no guidance within the Criminal Rules providing insight into the 
method of production of ESI and there is some indication that e-discovery issues are 
finally arising in criminal actions, now is the time to consider how such issues will be 
handled, before the deluge begins.  Instead of adopting the Civil Rules carte blanche to 
solve problems related to e-discovery in criminal actions when they arise, as O’Keefe 
suggests, this article advocates for appropriate amendments to the Criminal Rules.  These 
amendments will address the problems presented by the production of ESI in a manner 
which will be both similar and dissimilar to how they are handled in civil actions—an 
approach guided by the principle differences underlying the two sets of rules. 
¶9 When NASA decided to construct vehicles for exploration of the moon, they 
reinvented the wheel.  Now, as our legal system is ripe to handle e-discovery issues born 
in civil actions and tackle them in criminal actions, it should similarly reinvent the wheel 
and establish appropriate, specialized rules.   
II. THE EFFECT OF O'KEEFE 
A. United States v. O'Keefe 
¶10 Before he was indicted, Michael John O'Keefe, Sr. worked as a consular officer at 
the U.S. Consulate in Toronto, Canada.21  The United States brought bribery charges 
against him and a co-defendant, Sunil Agrawal, the chief executive officer of STS Jewels, 
Inc., related to improprieties in the processing of visa applications.22  The U.S. alleged 
that O'Keefe expedited visa appointments for individuals affiliated with STS Jewels in 
contravention of established procedures and that Agrawal gave O'Keefe gifts as quid pro 
quo for expediting applications.23   
¶11 Agrawal brought a motion to compel discovery, to which O'Keefe joined, pursuant 
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).24  The rule sets forth in relevant part that “the 
government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, 
papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or 
portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government's possession, custody, 
or control.”25 In addition, the production must only be made if either: the item(s) are 
material to the preparation of a defense, the government plans to use the item(s) during its 
case-in-chief during trial, or the item(s) belong to or were seized from the defendant.26  In 
their motion, Agrawal and O'Keefe claimed that they were entitled to discovery from the 
 
21 United States v. O'Keefe, Criminal No. 06-0249, 2007 WL 1239204, at *1 (D.D.C. April 27, 2007) 
(containing the initial order of United States District Judge Friedman granting discovery to the defendants 
pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)). 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). 
26 Id. 
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government, because what they sought to obtain was “material” to their defense.27  
Specifically, they wished to show that they lacked the requisite mens rea to commit 
bribery (Agrawal in giving, O'Keefe in taking) through the use of documents that showed 
that there were no set procedures regarding expediting visa appointments; even if there 
were such policies, they were routinely violated by all consulars.28  
¶12 After receiving paper documents and ESI pursuant to an order finding their 
requested production “material” under Rule 16(a)(1)(E),29 the defendants filed a second 
motion to compel, which claimed that the government had not fully complied.30  They 
first took issue with the manner in which both paper and electronic documents were 
searched, and they demanded that the government provide a detailed description of what 
was searched, how it was searched, and who performed the search.31  Next, in regard to 
paper production, the defendants complained that the government produced in a manner 
that made it “impossible to identify the source or custodian of the document,” and they 
demanded that the government produce an index identifying a document's custodian, 
source, and Bates number.32  Finally, the defendants presented several objections 
regarding the government's electronic production, including the manner in which the 
government searched for relevant ESI and its preservation efforts.33  The defendants also 
expressed concern about the government’s handling of metadata.34 
¶13 Before evaluating the parties' claims on their merits, Judge Facciola set forth the 
authority he would use to guide his decisions on these matters of criminal discovery.  
Noting that there were no rules courts could look to for guidance regarding the form of 
production in criminal actions, Judge Facciola decided that because the Civil Rules 
“speak specifically to the form of production,” he would use them to settle the parties' 
discovery disputes.35  He went even further, however, and stated that the Civil Rules had 
been in use and refined over many years, and the problems presented by the production of 
documents (both paper and electronic) are universal, regardless of whether they arise in a 
civil or criminal action.36  He implied that it would be imprudent to look elsewhere for 
 
27 O'Keefe, 2007 WL 1239204, at *1. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.; United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 2008). 
30 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
31 Id. at 16–18. 
32 Id. at 18.  
33 Id. at 21–24. 
34 Id. at 22–24.  Metadata is “data about data.”  See ALLISON BRECHER & SHAWNNA CHILDRESS, 
EDISCOVERY PLAIN & SIMPLE: A PLAIN ENGLISH CRASH COURSE IN E-DISCOVERY 54–55 (2009).  
Contained in the native file, it is “[s]econdary data that organize, manage, and facilitate the use and 
understanding of primary data.”  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1080 (9th ed. 2009).  Some examples of 
metadata include: 
"a file's name, a file's location (e.g., directory structure or pathname), file format or file type, 
file size, file dates (e.g., creation date, date of last data modification, date of last data access, 
and date of last metadata modification), and file permissions (e.g., who can read the data, who 
can write to it, who can run it). . . .  Most metadata is generally not visible when a document 
is printed or when the document is converted to an image file." 
Irwin v. Onondaga Cnty. Res. Recovery Agency, 895 N.Y.S.2d 262, 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 
(quoting Mark A. Berman & Hall N. Beerman, On “Metadata,” Instant Messaging and Bates Stamping, 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 2007, at 3). 
35 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
36 Id.  
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authority, and concluded that “it is far better to use these rules than to reinvent the 
wheel.”37 
¶14 As for the defendants’ qualms with the government's methods of searching for ESI, 
Judge Facciola was not convinced that the defendants deserved relief.38  In their motion 
to compel, O'Keefe and Agrawal criticized several aspects of the government's search 
methods, including the quality of the keywords used and their failure to use proper 
“forensic searchware.”39  Mindful of the work of the Sedona Conference, which 
highlighed how complex these questions regarding search truly are, Judge Facciola 
denied the defendants’ request.40  He instructed that if they wished to pursue these 
complaints further, they would have to file a motion to compel satisfying the 
requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.41 
¶15 Lastly, and most relevant to this article, Judge Facciola discussed the defendants' 
worries about metadata.42  In their motion, they stated that while it was not “per se 
problematic” that the government produced ESI as electronic images files,43 the 
defendants had concerns about the role of metadata at later stages in the case.44  Again 
utilizing Rule 34 of the Civil Rules, Judge Facciola invoked the subsections dealing 
primarily with the production of ESI, Rules 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) and 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).45  The 
first requires that a responding party produce ESI in the form in which it is ordinarily 
maintained or in a form that is reasonably usable.46  The second states that in doing so, 
the responding party does not have to produce ESI in more than a single form.47  Since 
the government had already produced PDF and TIFF files, he concluded that unless the 
defendants could show that for some reason the files were not reasonably usable (without 
metadata), the government was in compliance with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).48  Furthermore, 
if the defendants wished to ensure that the government retained the native files with their 
metadata, they would have to secure it with a stipulation or file a motion to compel if the 
 
37 Id.  
38 See id. at 22–24. 
39 Id. at 22, 24. 
40 Id. at 24 (citing The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and 
Information Retrieval, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189 (2008)). 
41 Id.  By referencing Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Facciola indicated that he would 
require testimony that reflected “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” by an individual 
qualified as an expert.  FED. R. EVID. 702.    
42 See O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.  
43 The Government usually produced PDF or TIFF files, which are static file formats converted from the 
file format in which they were natively maintained.  See PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, 
Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *2 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007)  
(“A Tagged Image File Format (abbreviated as TIFF) is a flexible and adaptable file format 
for storing images and documents used worldwide.  TIFF files use LZW lossless compression 
without distorting or losing the quality due to the compression.  In layman's terms, TIFF is 
very much like taking a mirror image of many documents in format that can be compressed 
for storage purposes.”).  
While often searchable, electronic image formats lack the metadata contained in the native files from 
which they were derived.  See BRECHER & CHILDRESS, supra note 34.  
44 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.  
45 Id.  
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). 
48 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.  
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government refused.49  In commenting that the government's production of files in PDF 
and TIFF formats complied with “these rules [34(b)(2)(E)(ii) and 34(b)(2)(E)(iii)],” 
Judge Facciola seemed to imply that the government would not have to produce files in 
an additional format pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).50 
B. O'Keefe’s Progeny 
¶16 Judge Facciola’s application of the Civil Rules to e-discovery issues arising in a 
criminal action, for what appears to be the first time, has caused O’Keefe to emerge as the 
likely seminal case on criminal e-discovery.  The case’s importance did not go unnoticed 
by e-discovery commentators in the blogosphere, who discussed the long-term 
implications of the decision.51  Nor was it ignored by law firms52 or e-discovery 
vendors.53  Most commentary on the decision, however, focused on the fact that O’Keefe 
“was the first opinion to suggest that judicial review of alleged search deficiencies [in the 
production of ESI] requires expert testimony.”54  This is not surprising, considering that 
most, if not all, notable e-discovery commentators either practice or are primarily 
concerned with civil law matters (and few criminal actions to date have been concerned 
with ESI search methods).  In fact, several civil cases have cited to and followed 
O’Keefe’s rationale regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the need for expert 
testimony in challenging a responding party’s search methods.55 
¶17 Those concerned with criminal law have also taken note of this important case and 
its unique application of civil law rules to criminal actions.56  During the course of his 
criminal trial on federal corruption charges,57 former Senator Ted Stevens advanced 
similar claims to the O’Keefe defendants.58  In addition, less than four months after Judge 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  See infra Part IV.A.  
51 See, e.g., Ralph Losey, Criminal Case Raises Interesting e-Discovery Search Issues, E-DISCOVERY 
TEAM (Feb. 24, 2008, 2:24 PM) (original website no longer available), reprinted in Program Materials on 
Technology in the Practice & Workplace Committee Midyear Meeting, held by American Bar Association 
Section of Labor and Employment Law (May 1–2, 2008), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/labor/mw/2008/tech/pdf/LEL-Tech-Materials.pdf; Mark F. Foley, Expert Testimony 
May Be Needed for e-Discovery Keyword Searches, WTN NEWS (Mar. 4, 2008), 
http://wistechnology.com/articles/4585/. 
52 See, e.g., Kirby D. Behre & Adam J. Schwartz, Government’s Discovery Deficiency in a Criminal 
Case Subject to Increased Scrutiny, PAUL HASTINGS STAYCURRENT (March 2008), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/868.pdf?wt.mc_ID=868.pdf. 
53 See, e.g., Valerie Elizabeth Powell & George J. Diliberto, Avoiding Pitfalls: Expert Testimony on the 
Adequacy of Key Word Searches, WINSTAR LITIGATION SYS. (MAY 13, 2009), 
http://www.winstarlitsys.com/files/34989449.pdf. 
54 See generally Losey, supra note 51. 
55 E.g., Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008) (holding that the attorney-
client privilege or work product protected status had been waived in regard to several electronic documents 
that the producing party failed to discover during a privilege review while not using reasonable search 
terms). 
56 See Murphy & Byers, supra note 16.  
57 United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177, 178 (D.D.C. 2009). 
58 Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, United States v. 
Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-321) (quoting United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 
2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2008)  
("Criminal discovery is not a game.  It is integral to the quest for truth and the fair 
adjudication of guilt or innocence.  But even civil litigants must either produce documents as 
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Facciola handed down his decision, the United States Attorneys' Bulletin, published by 
the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, featured an article on e-discovery and 
criminal law.59  After citing to O’Keefe, the article warned that “prosecutors should be 
aware that federal judges may hold them to certain standards common to civil 
litigation.”60  Taking an apparent cue from Judge Facciola’s adoption of the Civil Rules, 
the article followed with a basic crash course on the fundamentals of e-discovery—
everything from litigation holds to metadata.  If a reader were somehow unaware of the 
article’s title or purpose, the majority of its content could be reasonably confused with a 
civil litigator’s pocket manual on e-discovery.   
¶18 Judge Facciola’s opinion did not discuss the vast majority of e-discovery topics 
included in the bulletin.  This is an important observation, as it appears that the authors, 
and likely several decision makers at the United States Department of Justice, believed 
that Judge Facciola had fired the opening salvo in the judiciary’s wholesale adoption of 
the Civil Rules pertaining to e-discovery.  The inclusion of information on a broad array 
of e-discovery topics would prepare their readership accordingly. 
¶19 Although the O’Keefe opinion captured the attention of the legal blogosphere, 
armed criminal defense attorneys with more fodder for their clients’ motions to compel, 
and even brought some level of concern to the United States Department of Justice, one 
obvious reaction appears to be missing—critique.61  Despite a bold judicial opinion that 
facially advocated for imputing the procedures of civil law to criminal law, few voices 
have emerged discussing the opinion’s merits.  In what appears to be the only article62 
(albeit unpublished) to do so, the author is only somewhat critical of Judge Facciola’s 
bold statements.63  While discussing two courts’ diverse approaches to the application of 
the Civil Rules to paper “data-dumping” in criminal actions, the author does, however, 
conclude that the Criminal Rules need to be changed to address e-discovery.64   
 
they are kept in the course of business or label the documents in response to requested subject 
areas.  Where the government produces documents in ‘an undifferentiated mass in a large box 
without file folders or labels, then these documents have not been produced in the manner in 
which they were ordinarily maintained as [Fed. R. Civ. P. 34] requires’ and thus the 
government has equally failed to meet its obligations under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.”)  
(citations omitted)).  
59 See Andrew D. Goldsmith & Lori A. Hendrickson, Investigations and Prosecutions Involving 
Electronically Stored Information, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., May 2008, at 27, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5603.pdf.   
60 Id. at 27.  
61 The omission is odd, particularly in the legal profession. 
62 Between the initial writing of this article and its publication, Daniel B. Garrie and Daniel K. Gelb 
published an excellent piece asserting, as this article does, that criminal law deserves specific e-discovery 
rules.  See Daniel B. Garrie & Daniel K. Gelb, E-Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Need for Specific Rules, 
43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 394 (2010).  While citing O'Keefe as the closest thing that the federal criminal 
justice system has to a landmark case or rule in regard to e-discovery, this is the full extent of the authors’ 
discussion of this particular case.  Id. at 399.  Thus, even though their article advocates for specialized e-
discovery rules, the authors are not explicitly critical of O'Keefe's proposition that it is unnecessary to 
reinvent the wheel when it comes to e-discovery in criminal actions.   
63 See David W. Degnan, United States v. O’Keefe: Do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Provide the 
Proper Framework for Managing “Data Dumping” in a Criminal Case? (2008) (unpublished paper), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/david_degnan/1 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
64 Id. at 26–27.  
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C. Rationale and Respect 
¶20 Although this article seeks to promote an alternative view to the blanket adoption 
of the Civil Rules to solve e-discovery problems in criminal actions, it does not disagree 
with the ultimate order Judge Facciola reached as a result of applying the Civil Rules.  To 
wit, it has been said that his ruling “provide[d] a thoughtful and well reasoned opinion” 
for all the parties.65  The authority of a judge to modify discovery procedures when 
appropriate in a criminal action lies in Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1), which states, “At any 
time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or 
grant other appropriate relief.”66  Thus, Judge Facciola was well within the bounds of his 
authority to look to the Civil Rules as he did.  Another approach that judges have taken 
under Rule 16(d)(1), instead of adopting the Civil Rules, is to design their own 
procedures that are tailored to the needs of the case at bar—an approach taken in United 
States v. Gonzalez.67  In Gonzalez, the district court judge set forth her own procedures 
relevant to the production of ESI in a criminal action.68  The order made no reference to 
O’Keefe, despite being filed one year afterward.69  One can only speculate as to whether 
this served as a rejection of its rationale. 
¶21 While using the Civil Rules may have yielded the correct result in O’Keefe, the 
rationale for looking to these rules generally is somewhat more suspect: 
¶22 In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to which the courts can look for 
guidance in determining whether the production of documents by the government has 
been in a form or format that is appropriate.  This may be because the “big paper” case is 
the exception rather than the rule in criminal cases.  Be that as it may, Rule 34 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure speak [sic] specifically to the form of production.  The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their present form are the product of nearly 70 years 
of use and have been consistently amended by advisory committees consisting of judges, 
practitioners, and distinguished academics to meet perceived deficiencies.  It is foolish to 
disregard them merely because this is a criminal case, particularly where, as is the case 
here, it is far better to use these rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production of 
documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same problems.70 
¶23 This article will conclude that the wheel is worth reinventing and will set forth a 
few illustrative sample amendments to the Criminal Rules.  
¶24 Even after the new amendments to the Civil Rules pertaining to ESI went into 
effect on December 1, 2006, judges have been left alone to solve thorny issues both 
inside and outside the text of the rules.71  Thus, when influential judges such as Judge 
Facciola hand down opinions addressing new wrinkles in the law of e-discovery, they are 
“treated like papal encyclical[s].”72  Apart from his substantive contributions, he is 
 
65 Id. at 19. 
66 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). 
67 Crim. Action No. 08-10223-PBS, 2009 WL 1543798 (D. Mass. May 26, 2009). 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
70 United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis added). 
71 Jason Krause, Rockin' Out the E-Law: A Few Federal Judges are Becoming Stars as They Create New 
E-Discovery Rules, ABA J., July 2008, at 48, 49–51 (discussing the significant role a few judges have had 
in effecting the rules of e-discovery). 
72 Id. at 49. 
 182
Vol. 9:3] Jared S. Beckerman 
regarded by many in the legal community as one of the few judges with such a “deep 
understanding [of] e-discovery.”73  
¶25 Although this article puts forth an academic disagreement with Judge Facciola’s 
commentary in a single case, it is important to point out not only his substantial 
contributions to the field of e-discovery, but the fact that few are more qualified to speak 
on such issues than he.  Deservedly considered a “rock star” in the field, Judge Facciola 
has authored several influential and highly regarded opinions on the topic of e-discovery 
apart from O’Keefe, including McPeek v. Ashcroft and Citizens for Responsibility and 
Ethics in Washington v. Executive Office of the President.74   
III. BREAKING (DOWN) THE RULES 
¶26 The principles underlying the Civil Rules and the Criminal Rules are undoubtedly 
different.  The fact that the two areas warrant their own set of procedural guidelines is 
itself a testament to the substantive dissimilarity between criminal and civil law.  
Specifically, as Chief Justice Warren E. Burger once observed, “in criminal cases, finality 
and conservation of private, public, and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil 
litigation.”75  It is not the purpose of this article to fully analyze this intuitive conjecture; 
however, as it is a major premise on which this article rests, it is worth a brief 
consideration.   
¶27 The logical starting points in explaining the differing principles behind the rules are 
perhaps the most overlooked: Rule 1 of the Civil Rules and Rule 2 of the Criminal Rules.  
These two sections set out the scope and purpose of their respective body of rules.  Rule 1 
of the Civil Rules states in relevant part, “[the Civil Rules] should be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding,”76 and Rule 2 of the Criminal Rules states, “[the Criminal Rules are] to be 
interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure 
simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable 
expense and delay.”77   
¶28 Providing the “purpose” of their respective procedural guidelines, Rules 1 and 2 
often aid courts in the interpretation of other corresponding rules.78  From a comparative 
standpoint, however, the sentiments of Rule 1 and Rule 2 appear strikingly similar.  Both 
focus on ensuring ends that are just and reached in a fast and inexpensive manner.79  
 
73 See Losey, supra note 51. 
74 See Krause, supra note 71, at 49 (citing McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (ordering 
the Department of Justice to perform backup restoration of emails on Plaintiff's supervisor’s computer); 
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Exec. Office of the President, Civil Action No. 07-1707, 
2008 WL 2932173 (D.D.C. July 29, 2008)).  
75 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 465 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
77 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (emphasis added). 
78 See United States v. Pinto, 44 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D. Mich. 1968).  See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing 
Rule 1 and the general purpose of Civil Rules).  
79 Rule 2 of the Criminal Rules also discusses simplicity and fairness, which are facially absent from 
Rule 1 of the Civil Rules.  These two terms, however, have been interpreted to be important (albeit overtly 
absent) features of Rule 1.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee's note (1993) (stating courts have an 
obligation to “exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not 
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Thus, taken alone, Rules 1 and 2 do not provide conclusive answers to this inquiry, and 
one must appeal to additional authority. 
¶29  In fact, the parallels between the stated purposes of the Civil Rules and Criminal 
Rules were acknowledged by the Advisory Committee notes to the 1944 adoption of Fed. 
R. Crim. P. Rule 2.80  This would appear to go against the assertion that the Civil Rules 
and Criminal Rules are guided by differing principles.  However, although the Rules’ 
purposes are largely shared (i.e. justice, speed, low cost), their distinct differences in 
underlying principles are made apparent by the differing relative value civil and criminal 
law respectively place on these purposes. 
¶30 A rough cardinal ranking of the distinct values placed on justice, cost, and speed in 
criminal and civil cases can be derived by observing a few of the core differences 
between criminal and civil law.  Civil actions aim to settle disputes between private 
parties, with the purpose of obtaining some sort of legal or equitable remedy.81  Criminal 
actions seek to measure the guilt of a defendant related to alleged proscribed conduct.82  
The intuitive distinction between criminal and civil law that follows from these different 
goals has been acknowledged since the adoption of the United States Constitution.83  In 
fact, the “Bill of Rights clearly reflects this division: more than half its protections apply 
primarily to the criminally accused.”84  Such constitutional assurances for criminal 
defendants are necessary.  In civil cases, money is usually all that is at stake.  In criminal 
actions, however, a defendant has “at stake interest of immense importance, both because 
of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty 
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.”85   
¶31 For example, criminal defendants enjoy robust rights to a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.  By contrast, civil litigants have limited rights to a jury under the Seventh 
Amendment (rights for actions at law, not at equity) in federal court and lack such 
Seventh Amendment rights in state court, where the availability of a civil jury trial is a 
function of state law.86  In describing the nature of the Sixth Amendment, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit eloquently stated:  
¶32 The language of the Sixth Amendment does not admit of any indication that the 
absolute right to a jury trial in criminal cases can be modified by reasons of efficiency or 
public policy arguments. This reading of the Sixth Amendment comports with and is 
supported by the uniformly accepted notion that in criminal cases there is no mechanism 
 
only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay”) (emphasis added).  See also United States v. F. & M. 
Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 241 (1958) (“Simplicity and speed, when consonant with effective 
protection of the interests of the parties, are touchstones for the interpretation of all the Rules . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  
80 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 advisory committee's note. 
81 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 
(1st ed. 2008). 
82 See generally A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (3d ed. 
2008). 
83 Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: 
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1348 
(1991). 
84 Id. 
85 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
86 See Juries In-depth: Right to a Jury Trial, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, 
http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_right_overview.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
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available to the government comparable to making a motion for directed verdict or 
summary judgment in civil cases.  Indeed, no matter how strong and even overwhelming 
the evidence is, and although a judge can grant a judgment of acquittal in favor of the 
defendant before or even after the jury renders its verdict . . . a criminal defendant in 
federal courts can be convicted only by the verdict of a jury.87   
¶33 Additionally, under the Sixth Amendment, the right to a speedy trial88 (which 
should not be understood as being an efficiency factor89), confrontation of witnesses, 
compulsory process, and assistance of counsel are available in “all criminal 
prosecutions.”90  Both the substantive and procedural discrepancies between criminal and 
civil law are also well noted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which prescribe fourteen 
rules instructing the courts to rule on evidentiary matters differently in civil and criminal 
actions.91   
¶34 In granting these and other unique rights only to criminal defendants, the 
subordination of efficiency is far more apparent in the criminal context than in civil 
cases, because “[o]ur system of criminal justice prides itself on the ability to assure that 
no innocent person is convicted wrongfully, rather than on swift and immediate action. . . 
 
87 United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 895 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
88 A criminal defendant’s speedy trial rights may be particularly relevant when ESI is concerned.  The 
production of ESI is often an arduous and time consuming endeavor, especially when working with large 
amounts of data which must be culled down, searched for relevant files, reviewed for privilege, etc.  Civil 
trials are not unaccustomed to significant delay, especially when complex discovery is concerned.  In 
criminal cases, however, it appears that there may be an inherent tension between the prosecution’s 
thorough search and production of ESI and a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  It is difficult to speculate 
exactly how a court will apply a defendant’s speedy trial rights to e-discovery requests, as any such inquiry 
is approached by the court on a case-by-case basis.  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) 
(establishing a four-factor balancing test for evaluating defendants’ claims of deprivation of Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial rights).   
The Sixth Amendment is perhaps the most fundamental source of speedy trial rights.  The four factors 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker generally govern a court’s analysis of an alleged Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial violation, which include: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; 
(3) the manner in which the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the delay.  Id. at 530–533. 
As applied to delay resulting from the production of ESI, it would appear that absent extraordinary delay 
or bad faith, there is no per se violation of speedy trial rights under the Barker test.  The second and fourth 
factors would go against a defendant’s claim of unconstitutional delay, as it would be the result of the 
production of exculpatory evidence or production in compliance with a defendant’s own request for 
discovery.   
As the court in Barker pointed out, the right to a speedy trial is unique in that unlike other constitutional 
trial rights, a defendant may actually benefit from being deprived of a speedy trial.  Id. at 521.  For 
example, as time goes on, witnesses may become unavailable or their recollections may fade.  Id.  Thus, we 
cannot always presume a defendant is prejudiced by delay in a criminal case.  When ESI is concerned and a 
defendant only stands to benefit from its production, prejudice resulting from delay caused by the thorough 
examination of data is unlikely. 
Delay caused by the production of ESI may become actionable, however, if a defendant can show, for 
example, that the government’s search methods were so grossly ineffective that it caused delay that resulted 
in prejudice.  More likely, unconstitutional delay would be found in the presence of bad faith, such as the 
government using e-discovery purely as a stalling tactic. 
89 The right to a speedy trial contained in the Sixth Amendment should not be confused with the 
efficiency factor of speed.  In terms of efficiency, speed refers to those policies that push litigants through 
the courts for the purpose of conserving judicial resources, often to their detriment.  The speedy trial right, 
however, is offered for the benefit of a criminal defendant, not for any other purpose rooted in efficiency.  
See generally id. at 514. 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
91 See FED. R. EVID. 201, 404, 408, 410, 412, 413, 414, 609, 612, 704, 706, 803, 804, 1101.   
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. When faced with a choice between the need to prevent the innocent from possible 
wrongful conviction and efficient judicial administration and finality, [the courts] have 
consistently favored the former.”92 
¶35 Thus, because we provide criminal defendants with myriad tools for trial which 
civil litigants lack, there is a greater emphasis on “just determination” at the expense of 
efficiency factors (i.e. cost and time) in criminal actions.  To be sure, the degree of 
subordination varies greatly between cases and factual applications; however, the 
presence of the subordination of efficiency considerations, even if slight, is a defining 
characteristic of criminal law.  Accordingly, although Rule 1 of the Civil Rules requires 
courts adjudicating civil matters to take "just determination” seriously, Rule 2 of the 
Criminal Rules and the implicit dictates of the Constitution oblige criminal courts to take 
justice very, very seriously.   
¶36 Due to this differing weight given to the just, inexpensive and speedy factors, it is 
clear that any approach to the treatment of ESI in criminal actions should bear distinct 
characteristics reflective of these values.  Thus, the carte blanche imputation of the 
portion of the Civil Rules dealing with e-discovery to criminal procedure unduly ignores 
these differences and may achieve an end premised on a level of efficiency that would 
offend the hallmark values of criminal law.   
IV. DIFFERENT GAME, DIFFERENT RULES 
A. Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii): More Bytes at the Apple 
¶37 Under the Civil Rules, a responding party need not produce the same electronically 
stored information in more than one form.93  The policy behind this provision seems 
sound—allowing a requesting party only one bite at the apple promotes efficiency both in 
reducing the amount of money spent on production and encouraging carefully calculated 
requests to produce.  In criminal actions, however, application of this strict rule may 
conceivably undermine a “just determination” of the case. 
¶38 Suppose Don Defendant, on trial for bribery of an official, receives production of 
emails and Microsoft Word files from the government (because they are material as per 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)) in PDF format.  This production appears sufficient until, at 
a later point in the discovery process, it becomes apparent that metadata contained in the 
native files may yield custodian information that will contradict the government’s theory 
of the case.94  Don’s attorney would like to make a request for the repeated production of 
the ESI, but in a jurisdiction adopting the Civil Rules in criminal actions, he may have 
extreme difficulty.   
¶39 Don’s attorney could argue that the government’s production was not reasonably 
usable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).  However, since the PDF images were 
reasonably usable to the extent that the data could be analyzed without difficulty (albeit 
without metadata), this argument will fail.  In addition, any second request for the same 
ESI in a different format may be denied pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). 
 
92 Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893. 
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). 
94 See BRECHER & CHILDRESS, supra note 34. 
 186
Vol. 9:3] Jared S. Beckerman 
¶40 This situation, in which the initial production of ESI in an electronic image format 
appeared sufficient until the usefulness of metadata was later revealed, similarly arose in 
In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litigation.95  In Classicstar, the defendant company 
GeoStar complied with a court order by producing financial information in electronic 
image formats that could be successfully loaded into commonly used litigation 
management software.96  Later in the course of discovery, the plaintiffs found that the 
native format of the files would allow them to “query various search reports and extract 
the desired information in a fraction of the time” that it would otherwise take them using 
the produced electronic images.97  The court concluded that since GeoStar’s production 
was calculated to be reasonably usable to the plaintiffs and production in the native 
proprietary accounting software format was not practical without plaintiffs’ purchase of 
such software, GeoStar complied with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).98  The court acknowledged 
that in light of Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) and Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii)’s protection against repeated 
production in a second electronic format, GeoStar complied with the Civil Rules.  Still, 
the court nonetheless ordered the additional production in native format.99  GeoStar had 
previously made written overtures expressing its willingness to produce in native format, 
and the court held it to its promise, conveniently avoiding the harsh consequences of Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(iii).100 
¶41 Notwithstanding the written communication from GeoStar that eventually saved the 
Classicstar plaintiffs’ hides, had the court ruled purely according to Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), 
the second production may have been blocked.  In fact, there appears to be some level of 
judicial reluctance in applying the “one bite at the apple” dictate of Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).  
In Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Division, metadata became relevant to 
the requesting party’s case, but only after ESI had already been produced:   
[B]y the time the Plaintiffs first informed the Defendants of their desire for 
metadata . . . the Defendants' document collection efforts were largely complete 
and they had already produced many of their electronic documents in PDF format 
without accompanying metadata.  In these circumstances, the Plaintiffs face an 
uphill battle in their efforts to compel the Defendants to make a second 
production of their ESI. 101 
However, the court ultimately ruled: 
Nevertheless, because the metadata could potentially have some relevance . . . I 
will grant the Plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of metadata . . . but on 
the condition that the Plaintiffs pay all costs associated with a second production 
 
95 In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 WL 260954 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009). 
96 Id. at *1.  
97 Id. at *3.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. at *4. 
100 Id. at *3–4. 
101 Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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of these documents.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) (party need not produce 
the same ESI in more than one form).102 
It would seem that the court in Aguilar allowed for production in a second electronic 
format, despite a rule to the contrary.  While simultaneously quoting the strict language 
of 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), the court allowed repeated production and deferred to a cost shifting 
scheme absent from the text of the rule or accompanying Advisory Committee notes.103  
Aguilar’s approach offered a more workable standard and, perhaps, is an indication that 
courts are cognizant of the rule’s potentially draconian effects, even in a civil action.  In 
fact, few courts have denied repeated production of ESI while citing Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(iii).104  Additionally, the Advisory Committee notes for Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) 
feature an interpretation that is far more reasonable than the text of the rule, but is 
perhaps itself contradictory: “[w]hether or not the requesting party specified the form of 
production, Rule 34(b) provides that the same electronically stored information 
ordinarily need be produced in only one form.”105  The addition of the word “ordinarily” 
as a modifier severely weakens the harshness of the Rule, and unlike most Advisory 
Committee notes, which supplement the text of Rules or give examples of their 
application, this one seemingly contradicts Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii)’s apparent one-and-done 
 
102 Id. at 362. 
103 A court is certainly allowed to shift costs.  See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 
358 (1978)  
(“Under those rules, the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests, but [a judge] may invoke the district court's discretion 
under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue burden or expense’ in doing so, 
including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's payment of the costs of 
discovery.”).   
See supra Part IV.B.  However, this remedy does not appear in the mechanical application of the Rule, 
nor its corresponding Advisory Committee notes, so cost shifting in this case appears highly discretionary.  
Compare with the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26(b)(2), which expressly allow a cost shifting 
scheme (by providing factors to guide this analysis) instead of a bar on production.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 
advisory committee's note (2006); infra Part IV.B. 
Additionally, Rule 34(b)(2)(E) states that provisions such as subsection (iii) apply “[u]nless otherwise 
stipulated or ordered by the court.”  It can consequently be argued that a court may avoid applying Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(iii) entirely, even if the Civil Rules were to be applied to a criminal case, by resorting to its 
discretion.  While this is certainly true, it is especially important in the criminal context to not rely on the 
discretion of a court.   
While it is conceivable that courts will always apply Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) equitably, specialized rules 
will eliminate the need to rely on the prudence of a judge.  Procedures should be applied predictably and 
uniformly as often as possible, especially when dealing with criminal matters.  This is particularly true 
when dealing with cutting-edge legal issues that require some level of technological savvy.  Absent explicit 
instruction, courts may fail to exercise their discretion in the application of new, technical provisions such 
as Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), not due to a lack of compassion for a defendant, but rather ignorance that 
exercising their discretion is even necessary.      
104 See, e.g., Armor Screen Corp. v. Storm Catcher, Inc., No. 07-81091-Civ., 2008 WL 5262707 (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 17, 2008) (finding that Plaintiff did not have to reproduce in hard copy data which it had already 
produced in native form pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii)); Bellinger v. Astrue, No. CV-06-321, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71727 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009) ("[P]laintiff's counsel has apparently already familiarized 
herself with defendant's email production in paper form, and it would therefore be redundant and wasteful 
to require defendant to produce the emails again in electronic form; indeed, a party need not produce the 
same electronically stored information in more than one form."). 
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note (2006) (emphasis added). 
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requirement.  That said, it does not appear to have been cited in any opinions,106 despite 
the fact that it seems Classicstar and Aguilar could have relied on the Advisory 
Committee notes as a more elegant way to circumvent the stiffness of Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(iii).  
¶42 The pro-efficiency characteristics of Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) make it a poor fit for use 
in criminal actions.  The discussed civil cases demonstrate that there are instances in 
which the need for metadata only reveals itself after the producing party may have 
already turned over ESI in a non-metadata-bearing format.   
¶43 Despite the disparate application of this rule in civil actions, there is no guarantee 
that criminal courts will use their discretion to apply Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) leniently.  The 
court in O’Keefe was somewhat unclear as to whether it would apply the rule strictly, but 
appeared to imply that it would: 
¶44 But if, as occurred here, electronically-stored information is demanded but the 
request does not specify a form of production, the responding party must produce the 
electronically-stored information in the form in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a 
reasonably usable form or forms. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).  Additionally, a party 
"need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). 
¶45 If one were to apply these rules to this case, it appears that the government's 
production of the electronically stored information in PDF or TIFF format would suffice, 
unless defendants can show that those formats are not "reasonably usable" and that the 
native format, with accompanying metadata, meet the criteria of "reasonably usable" 
whereas the PDF or TIFF formats do not.107   
¶46 After citing Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), the court stated that the government’s production 
would suffice as long as it satisfied Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).  The court does not overtly 
declare that repeated production of ESI in native format would be blocked pursuant to 
 
106 Of the combined eleven cases found on Westlaw and LexisNexis which cite to Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), 
none make reference to this passage of the advisory committee notes to Rule 34.  See In re Classicstar Mare 
Lease Litig., No. 07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 WL 260954, *3–4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009); Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 
362; United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 23 (D.D.C. 2008); Armor Screen Corp., 2008 WL 
5262707; Bellinger, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71727; Secure Energy, Inc. v. Coal Synthetics, No. 
4:08CV01719, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 17, 2010) (“Here, Defendants state that 
Plaintiffs did not identify the requested form of ESI, and Defendants fulfilled their discovery obligations by 
producing the drawings in paper and portable document format.”); AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Techs. 
GmbH, No. 2:08cv569, 2010 WL 318477 (D. Utah Jan. 21, 2010) ("ALSTE contends that it should not be 
ordered to produce the documents again because the rule does not require it to produce the same 
electronically stored information in more than one form."); Green v. Fluor Corp., No. 08-176-FJP-SCR, 
2009 WL 1668376 (M.D. La. June 11, 2009) (“Moreover, because under Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) a party need 
not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form, the defendants have no right 
to view the same photograph in the plaintiff's email account.”); Sanbrook v. Office Depot, No. C 07-5938, 
2009 WL 840019 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (“Defendant must also produce any responsive information 
that it maintains in electronic form if that information has not otherwise been produced.”); White v. 
Graceland College Ctr. for Prof'l Dev. & Lifelong Learning, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263 (D. Kan. 
2008) (“The Rule also provides that a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in 
more than one form.”); QuinStreet, Inc. v. Ferguson, No. C08-5525RJB, 2009 WL 1789433 (W.D. Wash. 
June 22, 2009) (“Mr. Ferguson points out that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), he does not have to 
produce the emails in more than one form.”). 
107 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (emphasis added).  By saying “these rules,” the court references both 
Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) and Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), which appears to imply that the court would in fact block 
repeated production in native format under 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), and the only other way to compel this 
production would be to claim noncompliance with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 
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Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).  Rather, the court instructed the defendants that the only way to get 
production of native files would be to prove that the previous electronic images were not 
reasonably usable, so the O’Keefe court all but asserted that it would strictly apply 
34(b)(2)(E)(iii).  Thus, even if the defendants could have proved that the lynchpin of their 
defense was contained somewhere in metadata, it is unclear that the court would have 
allowed such production, cost shifting or not.  
¶47 In the civil realm it is more palatable to enforce Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) and attribute 
its negative consequences to a lack of foresight and poor lawyering.  In criminal actions, 
when a defendant’s life and liberty are on the line, this is a less acceptable outcome. 
¶48 Accordingly, in criminal actions, this article recommends a version of Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(iii) which allows for the repeated production of ESI, while putting the burden 
on the responding party to show that it is not reasonable: 
¶49 A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than 
one form as long as it can show that a secondary request is clearly duplicative or made in 
bad faith.  After this second production, any additional production of the same 
electronically stored information in a different form will require that the requesting party 
show that production is not duplicative and is reasonable.108 
¶50 This version of the rule will allow criminal defendants the ability to acquire the 
production of ESI with metadata, even if the need for such information only reveals itself 
after the responding party has already completely or substantially produced.  By placing 
this “safety value” into the text of the rule itself, criminal defendants will be afforded a 
more just manner of production without divine intervention (Classicstar) or use of the 
court’s discretion (Aguilar).  Additionally, this will likely negate the need for (or help 
anchor) ineffective assistance of counsel claims that may occur in the future once e-
discovery issues are more prevalent in criminal actions.109 
B. 26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b)(2)(C): Who Picks Up the Tab? 
¶51 As a general proposition, the party responding to a discovery request will usually 
bear the cost of production.110  However, when production will present an “undue burden 
or expense” to the responding party, a court may shift the cost of production to the 
requesting party.111  When ESI is concerned, the 2006 amendments to the Civil Rules 
provide specific standards to guide a court’s cost shifting inquiry112 in Rules 26(b)(2)(B) 
and 26(b)(2)(C).113  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states that a responding party need not produce ESI, 
 
108 This last sentence shifts the burden to the requesting party (usually the defendant) after production 
has already been made for a second time in an electronic form.  Without this shifted burden, it is possible 
that defendants could demand repeated production of the same ESI in different forms to either cause delay 
or annoyance.  It is instructive to a court that, although the initial threshold for the secondary production of 
ESI is intentionally low so as not to shut out a defendant from receiving potentially helpful discovery, this 
deference is not to be abused.  
109 This point will be explored further in Part V. 
110 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
111 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)). 
112 Unlike the case of Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii), which a court can read as shielding against repeated 
production of the same ESI (despite the court’s action in Aguilar, see supra Part IV.A), the advisory 
committee notes to Rules 26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b)(2)(C) expressly endorse courts to  shift costs (by providing 
balancing factors) to assuage the inequity of having to produce not reasonably accessible ESI.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2006).   
113 Before the passage of the 2006 amendments, the test articulated in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
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if it can show that it is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.114  A 
court may nonetheless order such discovery, if the requesting party can show good cause, 
considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).115  These factors include determining 
whether (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (2) the party 
seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by other discovery 
in the action; or (3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.116  This third factor could be particularly troubling in application to a criminal 
action. 
¶52 Rule 26(b)(2)(C) invites the court to consider several factors in determining 
whether the burden outweighs the benefit of production, including the amount in 
controversy and the parties’ resources.117  In a criminal action, what would the proxy for 
the “amount in controversy” be—the potential period of incarceration?  Ordering 
discovery that would cost $200,000 when the amount in controversy is only $100,000 in 
a civil action is clearly illogical.  In a criminal action, how high must the cost of 
production be in order to outweigh the “loss of life or liberty in controversy”?  
Additionally, considering a criminal defendant’s resources in evaluating a request for 
discovery is obviously inappropriate, as it may afford a wealthier defendant a greater 
chance to obtain broader e-discovery than a less wealthy defendant.118   
¶53 Despite the technical difficulties of translating this rule, the mere inclusion of these 
types of factors indicates the presence of efficiency considerations permeating the 
underlying principles of this cost shifting scheme.  To wit, it has been said that the 
rationale behind cost shifting in discovery has roots in market economics—a requesting 
party will only pay for the cost of discovery if it is worthwhile and its value will be offset 
by expected gains.119  One cannot expect a criminal defendant to perform this calculus 
with his or her liberty and reputation as variables. 
¶54 Thus, it appears worth articulating a version of these rules that would subordinate 
efficiency factors and apply specifically to criminal actions.  Cost shifting in civil actions 
is a difficult proposition requiring the balancing of many factors.  Application to a 
criminal action may prove even more difficult given several practical concerns.  While 
we do not want to make prosecution (especially of defendants in “big paper” cases, as 
seen in O’Keefe and white collar crime) too costly to the government, it also would be 
 
217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), was used to guide a court’s cost shifting analysis.  Although cost shifting 
is not explicit in the text of either rule, the Advisory Committee notes adopt a test clearly influenced by 
Zubulake’s seven factor test.  It has been noted, however that Rule 26(b)(2)(B) articulated a slightly 
broader standard, which is seen as more favorable to a responding party than the Zubulake test because the 
Rule protects a responding party from onerous searches of accessible data and Zubulake does not.  Since 
then, some courts have continued to apply the Zubulake test, whereas others apply the standard found in the 
Rules.  Some commentators have said that the “continued application of the Zubulake accessibility test . . . 
frustrates the purposes of the 2006 amendments by favoring the requesting party more than Rule 
26(b)(2)(B).”  See Bradley T. Tennis, Comment, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 119 YALE L.J. 1113 
(2010).  
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
115 Id.  
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
117 Id.  
118 Not that this is not arguably the case already, but procedural rules should not encourage disparate 
outcomes for defendants with disparate resources. 
119 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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unacceptable if the cost of defending oneself were prohibitive due to the application of an 
improper cost shifting regime. 
¶55 A proposed solution to the production of not reasonably accessible ESI would 
feature give and take—an extremely high threshold for a criminal defendant to reach 
before successfully compelling discovery, in exchange for eliminating cost shifting 
almost entirely: 
If the government claims the ESI requested by a defendant120 is not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost, then in order to compel discovery, 
the defendant must (1) identify the specific nature of the information sought, (2) 
demonstrate that this information is reasonably likely to have high probative 
value at trial,121 and (3) show that the information is likely to be contained at the 
location in which discovery is sought. 
By adding these three barriers to compelling discovery of not reasonably accessible data, 
the only requests that will withstand this level of scrutiny will be those that are carefully 
calculated and meritorious.  If a defendant can successfully convince a court that a 
specific piece of potentially highly probative admissible ESI is likely to be in a particular 
location, the request should be granted, with the government bearing the cost.122  The fact 
that requests must be compelling, well calculated, and specific should mitigate the ills of 
having the government bear all of the cost of producing not reasonably accessible data.  
These requirements eliminate the potential for frivolous requests or government-funded 
fishing expeditions, while also protecting a criminal defendant from the prospect of 
having to make a market calculation (i.e. whether the cost of production is worth more or 
less than jail time). 
¶56 Criminal defendants would also be protected from discovery requests for ESI from 
the government that they consider not reasonably accessible: 
¶57 A protective order shall be granted to a criminal defendant who files a motion 
pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence123 if the court determines that the 
 
120 Compulsory production required of the government, such as exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is intentionally left out of the cost shifting scheme.  It does not seem 
appropriate for materials that the government has in its possession and is required to turn over to a 
defendant to ever be subject to shifting.  However, it is not clear when this would practically arise, as it is 
unlikely the government would be aware of exculpatory material that is also not reasonably accessible.   
121 Note that this is a higher standard for the relevance of discovery than contained in FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16(a)(1)(E). 
122 The location of highly probative ESI may refer to either a physical location (e.g. hard drives and 
backup tapes) or a “logical” location within a specific electronic physical medium (e.g. a database or 
logical disk partition).  Whether a defendant would have to identify either a physical location, logical 
location, or both, would depend upon the nature and quantity of ESI in a given case.  For example, in a 
situation with twenty backup tapes, a court may only require identification of a specific tape.  Conversely, 
if there is only one backup tape in a given case that is not reasonably accessible, a court could require 
identifying a specific file or directory.     
123 Whether data is or is not reasonably accessible is necessarily a question for experts.  Accordingly, 
any such motion should have a technical basis, which is a similar to the approach that Judge Facciola took 
in O’Keefe in regard to search terms, as he keenly observed that, “[g]iven this complexity, for lawyers and 
judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than 
the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.  This topic is clearly beyond the ken of a 
layman and requires that any such conclusion be based on evidence that, for example, meets the criteria of 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”  United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 
2008).  
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motion sufficiently establishes that the production of ESI requested from the defendant is 
not reasonably accessible. 
¶58 This approach is a policy choice incorporating the spirit and values of criminal law 
and is by no means the only solution, or even the best.124  Although the government will 
bear the brunt of the cost of requests for not reasonably accessible ESI, this approach will 
encourage efficiency by requiring prosecutors and investigators to establish the proper 
infrastructure to manage e-discovery, as is similarly suggested for serial civil litigants.125 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶59 Apart from the previously mentioned benefits of applying e-discovery rules 
specifically tailored to the underlying principles of criminal law, there may be additional 
practical benefits.  First, it would serve to put members on both sides of the criminal bar 
on notice that e-discovery currently is and will increasingly be a concern in criminal 
actions.  At the moment, there is no guarantee that lawyers stepping into criminal court 
even know what e-discovery is.  Thus, even if one were to disagree with this article’s 
conjecture that criminal-specific e-discovery rules will at times lead to more equitable 
outcomes, it is hard to deny the virtue of putting criminal “paper lawyers”126 on notice of 
the new wave of discovery.  Additionally, promulgating criminal e-discovery rules will 
benefit criminal defendants in that widespread awareness of e-discovery rules would lead 
to more competent counsel and consequently minimize ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims pursuant to Strickland v. Washington.127  
¶60 Because of the difference in values underlying the Civil Rules and the Criminal 
Rules, it is not preferable to directly adopt the civil e-discovery rules in criminal actions 
in lieu of crafting specialized rules taking these values into account.  Although the 
technical problems involved in the production of ESI are shared in criminal and civil 
actions, the criminal law’s relative subordination of efficiency factors may in fact dictate 
different solutions to these problems than would the civil law.  This article consequently 
takes a respectfully different approach than the court did in United States v. O’Keefe and 
instead follows the logic of Dr. Wernher von Braun, who recognized that although the 
prospect may be daunting, it is sometimes appropriate to reinvent the wheel—literally or 
otherwise.   
124 For another proposed approach see Garrie & Gelb, supra note 62, at 413–14.   
125 LOSEY, supra note 16, at 15–38. 
126 Ralph Losey, Plato’s Cave: Why Most Lawyers Love Paper and Hate e-Discovery and What This 
Means to the Future of Legal Education, E-DISCOVERY TEAM, http://e-discoveryteam.com/school/plato’s-
cave-why-most-lawyers-love-paper-and-hate-e-discovery-and-what-this-means-to-the-future-of-legal-
education/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (“The paper lawyers do not believe their wild stories of a so-called 
information explosion.  They ignore the need to include requests for ESI in discovery.  They reject the new 
hash stamps of digital information and stubbornly cling to their Bates stamps.  The papers lawyers stick to 
the paper discovery.”). 
127 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a two-part test for asserting a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
